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Throughout American history, public officials, religious leaders,
scholars, and ordinary citizens have debated the proper relationship
between religion and government. Despite the volume of discussion
on this topic, a commonly-accepted answer remains elusive-the issue remains one of the primary wedges dividing the American populace. In the past, this debate has centered on taxpayer support for
religious institutions' and Sunday operation of postal service^.^ Today, the discussion has shifted to controversies over the display of
, ~ use of school vouchers to
religious symbols on public p r ~ p e r t y the
subsidize religiously-affiliated private school^,^ and the inclusion of
Few of these
"intelligent design" in public school science c~rricula.~
issues have flashed as suddenly into the national consciousness, however, as the constitutionality of the words "under God" in the Pledge
of Allegiance.
Despite United States Supreme Court dicta alluding to the
on June 26,
Pledge of Allegiance as unquestionably con~titutional,~
2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that both the 1954 Act
* J.D. candidate, University of St. Thomas School of Law; B.A., University of Minnesota.
I would like to thank Professor Thomas Berg for his guidance in preparing this Comment.
1. See Isaac Kramnick & R. Laurence Moore, The Godless Constitution: The Case Against
Religious Correctness 114-1 9 (paperback ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1997).
2. See id. at 13143.
3. See e.g. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
4. See e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U . S . 639 (2002); Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers
arid Religious Schools: The New Constitutional Questions, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151 (Fall 2003).
5. See e.g. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 2005 WL 2230024 (M.D. Pa. 2005); Jay D.
Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public
Schools, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 751 (Apr. 2003).
6. E.g. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pitt. Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1989);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984).
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of Congress inserting "under G o d into the Pledge and the state-sponsored recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools violate
the First Amendment prohibition of laws "respecting an establishment of religion" (hereinafter "Original Newdow").' The ruling drew
immediate criticism. According to President George W. Bush's
spokesperson, "[tlhe president's reaction was that this ruling is ridiculous."* The President's political foe, Democratic Senate Majority
Leader Tom Daschle, referred to the decision as "just nuts."9 Senator
Joseph Lieberman, the Democratic vice presidential nominee in 2000,
declared: "There may have been a more senseless, ridiculous decision
issued by a court at some time, but I don't remember it."lo The Ninth
Circuit subsequently amended its order, limiting the decision to the
recitation of the Pledge in public schools (hereinafter "Amended
Newdow")." The Supreme Court eventually overturned this ruling,
but avoided the substantive legal question by holding that the plaintiff, Michael Newdow, lacked standing to bring the case.12 The substantive controversy, however, is far from dead. On September 14,
2005, a federal judge in the Eastern District of California again found
the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional in a new case brought by
Mr. Newdow and two other families with children in the California
public school^.^"
The recent litigation surrounding the Pledge of Allegiance, including the Amended Newdow decision, has focused primarily on the
context in which it is recited-the recitation by school children, led
by a teacher, in a public school classroom. The litigation's focus on
state and local government actions requires application of the establishment clause beyond the federal government through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14
7. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
Court Rules Phrase in
8. E.g. David Kravets, 'Under God' Unconstitutional; Appeals
..
Pledge ~ n d o r s e sReligion, Chicago Sun-Times 3 (June 27, 2002).
9. Id.
10. E.g. Tom Vanden Brook, Critics Say Court was 'California Dreaming, ' USA Today 4A
(June 27, 2002).
I I. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003).
12. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). Mr. Newdow brought this
case on behalf of his daughter, a student in the Elk Grove Unified School District; the girl's
mother, however, had sole legal custody.
13. Newdow v. Cong. of U.S., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
14. The First Amendment expressly limits its application to the federal government. U.S.
Const. amend. I. The first Congress considered and rejected an amendment applying many of the
First Amendment provisions, but not the establishment clause, to the states: ''no state shall infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech or of the press, nor of the right of
trial by jury in criminal cases." 1 Annals of Cong. 783 (1789). Nonetheless. the Supreme Coun
has applied most of the Bill of Rights, including the establishment clause and the remainder of the
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This paper focuses on the text of the Pledge of Allegiance itself,
as adopted by Congress in federal statute, rather than the context of
its recitation. Section I examines the history of the Pledge of Allegiance and Congress's insertion of the phrase "under God." Section I1
investigates the original intent of the establishment clause by analyzing the text, the legislative history, and the philosophical underpinnings of the Constitution; the federalist structure of the new United
States government; and historical evidence from the early years of the
republic. Section 111 applies this interpretation to the 1954 Act of
Congress adding "under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance and the
two primary arguments justifying this action. Through this analysis,
one conclusion becomes apparent: the inclusion of "under G o d in
the Pledge of Allegiance is wholly inconsistent with the founding
generation's understanding, as embodied in the First Amendment establishment clause, of the proper relationship between religion and
the federal government.

The Pledge of Allegiance was written by Francis Bellamy as a children's recitation for the 400th anniversary of Columbus's discovery of
America.15 The original language of the Pledge contained no reference to
either God or the United States.16 In 1923 and 1924, the National Flag Conference, citing fears that immigrants may confuse the words "my Flag" for
the flag of their native land, amended the Pledge of Allegiance to reference
the United States of America.17 Congress first recognized the Pledge of
Allegiance in 1942 by adding it to the United States Flag Code as part of an
effort to "codify and emphasize existing rules and customs pertaining to the
display and use of the flag of the United States of America."18
First Amendment, to state and local governments through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Despite this clear
precedent, however, scholars continue to criticize incorporation. E.g. William K. Lietzau, Rediscol~eringthe Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of lncorporation, 39 DePaul L.
Rev. 1191 (1990).
15. National Flag Day Foundation, The Story of the Pledge of Allegiance, http://www.flag
day.org/Pages/PledgeHistory.html(accessed Oct. 24, 2006); Home of Heroes, The Pledge of Alle(accessed
giance, http://www. homeofheroes.com/hallofheroesllst~floorlflagl1bfc~pledge.html
Oct. 24, 2006).
16. "I pledge allegiance to my Flag, and to the Republic for which it stands: one Nation
indivisible, With Liberty and Justice for all." National Flag Day Foundation, supra n. 15; Home
of Heroes, supra n. 15.
17. National Flag Day Foundation, supra n. 15; Home of Heroes, supra n. 15.
18. H.R. Rpt. 77-2047 (Apr. 22, 1942); Sen. Rpt. 77-1477 (June 11, 1942). The codified
language reflected the changes made by the National Flag Conference in 1923 and 1924: "1 pledge
allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one
Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Act of June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-623, 5 7,
56 Stat. 380 (1942). In 1945, Congress amended the statute to officially designate, rather than
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In the early 1950s, the Pledge of Allegiance again gained national attention. On April 22, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Knights of Columbus adopted a resolution adding the words "under God" to the Pledge of
Allegiance recited at each of the organization's meetings.19 The following
year, the Knights of Columbus began adopting resolutions calling for Congress to formally insert "under God" into the Pledge.20 The effort to amend
the Pledge of Allegiance gained momentum with a February 1954 sermon
by the Reverend George M. Docherty endorsing the addition. This service
was attended by President Dwight Eisenhower and Senator Homer Ferguson, the author of the Senate
Congress officially inserted "under
God" into the Pledge of Allegiance later that year.22
The two motivating factors cited by Congress clearly manifest the religious intent behind the legislation. First, the words "under God" recognized Congress's belief that America is a religious nation.23 In support of
this premise, Congress cited several examples of religious references from
American history, including the 1620 Mayflower Compact, the 1776 Declaration of Independence, President Abraham Lincoln's 1863 Gettysburg Address, and the 1864 inscription of "In God We Trust" on American coins.24
Additionally, Congress focused on religion as the fundamental distinction
between the United States, with a foundation of "individuality and the dignity of the human being," and "the atheistic and materialistic concepts of
~~
communism with its attendant subservience of the i n d i ~ i d u a l . "President
simply refer to, the language as the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag of the United States; the text
of the Pledge itself was not affected. 79 H.R. Rpt. 79-61 1 (May 24, 1945); Pub. L. No. 79-287,59
Stat. 668 (1945).
19. Knights of Columbus, How the words "UNDER GOD" came to be added to the Pledge
of Allegiance to the Flag, http:~www.kofc.orglrc/en~about/activities/community/pledge~llegian~e
.pdf (accessed Oct. 17,2005); see also Pew Forum on Religion & Pub. Life, Legal Backgrounder:
One Nation under God? A Constitutional Question, http://pewforum.org/religion-schoolslpledge/
backgrounder.pdf (accessed Oct. 17, 2005); David Greenberg, The Pledge of Allegiance: Why
We're Not One Nation "under God," http://slate.msn.com/?id=2067499 (June 28, 2002).
20. Knights of Columbus, supra n. 19.
21. Sen. Rpt. 83-1287 (May 10, 1954); David Greenberg, supra n. 19.
22. Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249 (1954). This amendment to the
Pledge of Allegiance brought it to the form we know today: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the
United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." 4 U.S.C. 5 4 (2000).
23. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693 (May 28, 1954) (reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339) ("From the
time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions have reflected the traditional concept
that our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God."); Sen. Rpt. 83-1313 (May 10, 1954)
("Our forefathers recognized and gave voice to the fundamental truth that a government deriving
its powers from the consent of the governed must look to God for divine leadership.").
24. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; Sen. Rpt. 83-1313. The House committee also cited a report from the
Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress on the placement of the words to create
"a fundamental and basic characterization" of the United States as a religious nation. H.R. Rpt.
83-1693.
25. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; Sen. Rpt. 83-1313 (quoting Rev. Docherty: "There was something
missing in the pledge, and that which was missing was the characteristic and definitive factor in
the American way of life. Indeed, apart from the mention of the phrase, 'the United States of
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Eisenhower recognized both of these factors on June 14, 1954 in signing the
legislation:
From this day forward, the millions of our school children will
daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural
school house, the dedication of our nation and our people to the
Almighty. To anyone who truly loves America, nothing could be
more inspiring than to contemplate this rededication of our youth,
on each school morning, to our country's true meaning. . . . In this
way we are reaffirming the transcendence of religious faith in
America's heritage and future; in this way we shall constantly
strengthen those spiritual weapons which forever will be our
country's most powerful resource in peace or in war.26
Nearly fifty years after officially inserting "under God," Congress
again examined the language of the Pledge. Reacting to the Ninth Circuit's
invalidation of the 1954 statute as an unconstitutional establishment of religion, Congress cited the references to God from American history and
reaffirmed the text of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words "under

GO^."^^

In its most basic sense, traditional religious establishment is "the promotion and inculcation of a common set of beliefs through governmental
a ~ t h o r i t y . "Although
~~
establishment is foreign to most modern Americans,
the founding generation was knowledgeable and well-acquainted with it:
"virtually every American-and certainly every educated lawyer or statesman-knew from experience what those words meant."29 In Great Britain
and many of the other European countries from which Americans emigrated, official state religions established by law were common.30 Although
the American colonies themselves were part of Great Britain and formally
under the Church of England-colonial charters, the history of religious
dissent among colonists, and the vast span of the Atlantic Ocean created
significant diversity in the relationship between colonial governments and
religious institutions. Nonetheless, nine of the thirteen colonies maintained
some form of religious establishment at the onset of the Revolutionary
-

America,' it could be the pledge of any republic. In fact, I could hear little Moscovites repeat a
similar pledge to their hammer-and-slckle flag in Moscow with equal solemnity .").
26. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill to Include the
Words "Under God" in the Pledge to the Flag, in Publlc Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1954 563 (Off. of the Fed. Register, Natl. Archives & Recs. Sem.,
Gen. Servs. Admin~stration:U.S. Govt. Prtg. Off. 1960).
27. Pub. L. No. 107-293, 116 Stat. 2057 (2002).
28. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Purt I:
Establishmerrt of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2131 (2003) [hereinafter Establishrrient
and Disestablishrrient].
29. Id. at 2107.
30. Id.
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War." The traditional Anglican (Church of England) establishment remained common in the Southern colonies, while the New England colonies
adopted a system of multiple local establishments; New York maintained a
' this diversity
dual establishment of the Anglican and Dutch c h ~ r c h e s . ~As
demonstrates, the broad concept of religious establishment permits wide variation in the breadth and coerciveness of the regulations and in their tolerance for dissenting religious views.33
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits religious establishments by the federal government: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion."34 As noted above, however,
religious establishment is a broad concept with varied degrees of governmental entanglement with religion. Legal scholars and practitioners have
long debated the proper relationship between the federal government and
religion under the First Amendment. Although individual perspectives on
establishment clause analysis span a continuum of interpretations, these
viewpoints can be divided into four general schools of thought. Some scholars believe the establishment clause allows federal government interaction
with religious institutions, even to the point of favoring or disfavoring specific religious beliefs, as long as the action does not have "the purpose and
effect of coercing or altering religious belief or action" (hereinafter
"nonc~ercion").~~
Another school of establishment clause interpretation focuses on preference rather than coercion-the federal government may
favor religion generally, but may not grant preferential treatment to particuThird,
lar religious sects or denominations (hereinafter "n~npreference")."~
according to the neutrality perspective, federal government conduct must
"neither encourager ] nor discourager ] religious belief or practice. . . . [The
federal government] may not take a position on questions of religion in its
own speech, and it must treat religious speech by private speakers exactly
like secular speech by private speakers."37 Finally, strict separationists, focusing on Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaph~r,~"ead the es-

31. Id.
32. Id. at 21 16-29.
33. Id.
34. U.S. Const. amend. I.
35. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 933, 940 (198511986) [hereinafter Coercion].
36. E.g. Michael J. Perry, What Do the Free Exercise and Notrestabli.shment Norms Forbid?
Reflections on the Constitutional Law of Religious Freedom, 1 U. St. Thomas L.J. 549, 566
(2003).
37. Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments qf Silence: The Equal Status of Religious
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1986).
38. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, in Jefferson & Mudison on
Sepclratior~of Church and State 163, 163 (Lenni Brenner ed., Barricade Books 2004).
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tablishment clause as a prohibition of all governmental interaction with
religion.39
A cursory examination of American history may suggest the founding
generation was not offended by governmental religious speech-a position
consistent with the noncoercion and nonpreference positions. A deeper
analysis, however, paints a different picture of the establishment clause, at
least with respect to the federal government. Interpreting the text in light of
its legislative history suggests the drafters intended to restrict more than
religious coercion or preference by the federal government. Moreover,
many of the philosophical developments of the period and the federalist
structure of the Constitution, dividing governmental authority between a
limited national government and the several states, suggest the federal government was intended to be removed from religious issues. Finally, the historical evidence, although somewhat ambiguous, supports a broad
interpretation of the establishment clause.
Based on this analysis, the original intent of the establishment clause
prohibits more than the coercion of religious practices or preference of particular religious groups-the First Amendment was intended to require official silence by the federal government about religion.

A.

The Text and Legislative History of the First Amendment

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."40 Although this text, on its
face, may be interpreted to support any of the four general establishment
clause perspectives described above, analyzing the text in light of the alternative proposals considered and rejected suggests an intent to prohibit more
than religious coercion or preference of specific religious groups.41
The House of Representatives began debating constitutional amendments on June 8, 1789, when Representative James Madison proposed several amendments for c o n ~ i d e r a t i o n .These
~ ~ proposals included a first draft
of the religious liberty clauses: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged
on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any man-

p~

- -

39. See Steven K. Green, Of (Utz)equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectlbing the Imbalance
between Neutralify and Separatiotzism, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 1111 (2002).
40. U.S. Const. amend. I.
41. Professor Douglas Laycock clearly outlined the legislative history of the First Amendment religion clauses in an article analyzing the constitutionality of financial support for religious
institutions. Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Inrent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875, 878 (198511986) [hereinafter Nonpreferential Aidj.
42. 1 Annals of Cong. at 440-41, 451-53. Because different printings of the Annals of Congress have different pagination, the date is the most useful method for finding specific portions of
the record. Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid, supra n. 41, at n. 27. The version cited throughout this
paper is available online through the Library of Congress at http://rs6.loc.gov/arnmem/amlaw/
1wac.html.

636

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3 : 3

ner, or on any pretext, infringed."43 The House of Representatives referred
all of the proposals to a select ~ommittee.~"
On August 13, 1789, the House of Representatives resolved itself into
a committee of the whole to debate the select committee's proposed constitutional amendment^.^^ Two days later, on August 15, the House of Representatives began debating the select committee draft of the religious liberty
clauses: "no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights
of conscience be infringed."46 James Madison, responding to concerns that
the proposal would harm religion, stated he "apprehended the meaning of
the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce
the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any
manner contrary to their con~cience."~'Madison later proposed amending
the language to read: "No national religion shall be established by law.""*
According to Madison, "the people feared one sect might obtain preeminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they
would compel others to conform. He thought that if the word 'national' was
introduced, it would point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to prevent."49 Madison withdrew his amendment, however, after Elbridge Gerry attacked it as an attempt to establish a national, rather than a
limited federal, g~vernment.~'
Near the end of the August 15 debate the House of Representatives
voted, without significant recorded debate, to scrap the select committee
draft in favor of alternative language proposed by Representative Samuel
Livermore: "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing
the rights of c o n ~ c i e n c e . "On
~ ~ August 20, 1789, the House of Representatives returned to the religious liberty clauses and approved language between the narrow restrictions of the select committee draft and the broad
restrictions proposed by Livermore: "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of
conscience be infringed."52 The following day, the House of Representa-

-

43. 1 Annals of Cong. at 45 1.
44. Id. at 467-68.
45. Id. at 734.
46. Id. at 757.
47. Id. at 758.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 759.
50. Id. at 758-59.
51. Id. at 759.
52. H.R. J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1789). This is the language reported from the Committee
of the Whole to the House of Representatives for consideration. The version reported in the Annuls of Congress differs slightly from the one included in the Journal of the House of Representatives, but the discrepancies are not in the establishment section and do not suhstantively affect the
meaning of the language. 1 Annals of Cong. at 796; see also Laycock, Nonpreferenrial Aid, supra
n. 4 1, at 879.
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tives finally approved and sent to the Senate all of its proposals for constitutional amendments, including the religious liberty provision^.^^
The Senate began its consideration of the religious liberty clauses with
the House of Representatives' draft of the language.54 The first proposed
modification in the Senate clearly reflected the nonpreferential perspective
of the establishment clause: "Congress shall make no law establishing one
religious sect or society in preference to others, nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed."55 The Senate also considered and rejected, apparently
for stylistic reasons, two proposed variations equally clear in prohibiting
only the preference of particular religious groups over others.56 Later that
day, however, the Senate replaced this unambiguously nonpreferential language with the same establishment and free exercise language-without the
freedom of conscience language-adopted
by the House of

representative^.^^
A week later, the Senate again considered the religious liberty clauses.
The Senate, rejecting its previous proposal, adopted and sent to the House
of Representatives the narrowest version of the establishment clause considered: "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode
of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. . . ."58 After the
House of Representatives rejected this narrow proposal, a conference committee produced the language that ultimately became the First
Amendment.59
The noncoercion perspective interprets the establishment and free exercise clauses as protecting two sides of the same religious liberty right.
The free exercise clause forbids government proscription; the establishment clause forbids government prescription. . . . Thus, a
broad free exercise right bars government inhibition, deterrence,
or discrimination; a broad establishment clause right bars religious coercion, inducement, or, once again, discrimination-in one
direction or the other.60
In support of his noncoercion interpretation of the establishment
clause, Professor Michael McConnell (now a judge on the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals) cited James Madison's statement during the congres53. H.R. I., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. at 85.
54. Sen. J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1789). During the early Congresses, Senate proceedings
were not open to the public; its debates are therefore not available for review or analysis. Because
none of the floor debates are available, inferences must be drawn from the Senate action on
proposals offered and considered.
55. Sen. J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. at 70.
56. Id; see also Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid, supra n. 41, at 880.
57. Sen. J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. at 70.
58. Id. at 77.
59. H.R. J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. at 121; Sen. J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. at 86-88.
60. Michael Allen Paulsen, Religion, Equaliry, and the Constitution: Atz Equal Protection
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311, 313-314 (1986).
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sional debate that he "apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that
Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation
of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to
their conscience" and that he "believed that the people feared one sect
might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform."61 This statement, however, is irrelevant to understanding the clause; Madison made the statement
about the select committee draft, which was notably different than the text
ultimately adopted.
The noncoercion perspective, in addition to having little support in the
legislative history, conflicts with generally accepted principles of constitutional interpretation. Constitutional and statutory provisions are presumed
to have been added for a purpose; they are not interpreted as meaningless,
superfluous, or duplicative of other provisions.6' The plain meaning of the
free exercise clause, however, adequately protects against governmental coercion of religious belief: "Coercion to observe someone else's religion is
as much a free exercise violation as is coercion to abandon my own. If
coercion is also an element of the establishment clause, establishment adds
nothing to free exercise."63 Thus, the noncoercion interpretation of the establishment clause would render the free exercise clause meaningless, conflicting with traditional rules of interpretation.
This legislative history also suggests the establishment clause was intended to prohibit more than governmental preference of particular religious
groups. The select committee language does support the nonpreference perspective-"no religion" allows an inference that "many religions exist, and
that no one of them may be established by law," especially when compared
to the hypothetical formulation "[rleligion shall not be established by
law."64 James Madison's comments during the initial debate and his proposed addition of the word "national" also support the nonpreference interpretation. The House of Representatives, during the early discussion of this
amendment, appeared focused on preventing the creation of a "Church of
the United States" along the lines of the Church of England. These inferences in support of nonpreference are destroyed, however, by the House of
Representatives' abandonment of the select committee language in favor of
Samuel Livermore's amendment-the broadest establishment language
considered by either house of Congress. Although the language ultimately
adopted is clearly narrower than the Livermore proposal, the rejection of
language unambiguously reflecting the nonpreference perspective suggests
an intent to prohibit more than the preference of particular religious groups.
61.
62.
63.
64.

McConnell, Coercion, supra n. 35, at 936-37.
E.g. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).
Laycock, Nonpreferenrial Aid, supra n. 41, at 922.
Id. at 886.
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The text and legislative history refute the noncoercion and nonpreference interpretations of the establishment clause. If the establishment clause
were only intended to prohibit religious coercion, the establishment clause
would add nothing to the free exercise clause; such an interpretation conflicts with fundamental principles of constitutional construction. Moreover,
the express consideration and rejection of language unambiguously embodying the nonpreference view in favor of broader proposals clearly indicates
an intention to restrict more than preferences for specific religious groups.
Thus, the text and legislative history suggest the framers also intended to
prohibit governmental preference of religion generally.
B.

The Philosophy Underlying the Constitution and ChurcWState
Relations

Properly understanding the new theory of government-religion relations implicit in the text of the First Amendment requires an analysis of the
philosophical foundation of the new federal government. Although it is
clear Americans were far from unanimous in their philosophical and religious beliefs, the new governmental structure created by the Constitution
represents the culmination of several movements redefining the social, political, and religious institutions governing human behavior. It is impossible
to precisely measure the influence of particular beliefs or movements, but
the influence of some philosophical developments on the new American
government is evident from the writings of the founding fathers and the text
of the Constitution itself.

1. Roger Williams
The first signal of the philosophical shift away from religious establishment in America was Roger William's formation of Rhode Island following his banishment from the Massachusetts Bay colony. Massachusetts
Bay was founded by Puritans believing themselves "heirs to the ideal of the
Christian c~mrnonwealth."~~
Like the religious establishments in Europe,
religion and civil government were fused in the colony.66 Roger Williams,
however, believed the purity of religion depended on godless g~vernment.~'
Government is a man-made creation necessary-because of man's sin and
because God does not directly rule the world-to manage relationships
among men.68 Thus, the skills of successful governance are wholly unrelated to religious belief:
We know the many excellent gifts wherewith it hath pleased God
to furnish many, inabling them for publike service to their Coun65.
66.
67.
68.

Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1, at 47.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 54.
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tries both in peace and war (as all ages and experience testifies)
on whose soules hee hath not yet pleased to shine in the face of
Jesus Christ.69
According to Williams, "government was the business of men, while
the church was the business of God"-it is blasphemous for a government
to claim itself Christian or party to a divine contract, and the only way for
government to promote religion is to ignore it.70
2.

John Locke

Much of the American Constitution, including the protection of religious liberty, was influenced by the political philosophy of John Locke.
Locke's philosophy centered on a social contract as the sole basis of legitimate government. Men are naturally in "a state of perfect freedom to order
their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think
fit."71 In order to advance peace, safety, and the public
men form
civil governments by granting some of their natural freedom to the communit^.^^ Thus, a commonwealth is "a society of men constituted only for the
procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests," which include life, liberty, health, and property.74
Responsibility for the salvation of each man's soul belongs exclusively
to himself-because the salvation of a man's soul requires free belief, this
authority can not be transferred to the community.75 "[A111 the power of
civil government relates only to men's civil interests, is confined to the care
of the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to
come."76 Churches-"voluntary societ[ies] of men, joining themselves together of their own accord, in order to the public worshipping of God, in
such manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation
of their souls7'-are responsible for facilitating man's pursuit of the world
to come.77 Locke's philosophy, therefore, saw civil government and religion as distinct institutions, with distinct spheres of influence, which must be
strictly separated in order to effectuate the unique function of each.
John Locke's philosophy on government is apparent from the text of
the Constitution and the writings of its proponents. The Preamble of the
69. Id. at 53-54 (quoting Roger Williams).
70. Id. at 48, 57.
71. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in Two Treatises of Government and a
Letter Concerning Toleration 100, 101, 5 4 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale U. Press 2003).
72. Id. at 156, 5 131.
73. Id. at 136-37, $5 87-88.
74. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in Two Treatises of Government and a
Letter Concerning Toleration. supra n. 71 at 21 I. 218.
75. Id. at 218-219.
76. Id. at 220.
77. Id.
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Constitution clearly states that the authority of the new American government flowed from a social contract between each member of society:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitutionfor the United States of America."
The Constitution also limited the powers of the new federal government to those expressly granted in the document (and thus granted by the
people governed by it). These powers include only matters relating to the
earthly interests of life, liberty, and pr~perty.'~The Constitution also ensured the new government would remain open to all citizens, without regard
to religious belief or practice, by stating unambiguously that "no religious
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust
under the United States."" Finally, the influence of Locke's social contract
theory is apparent from the Federalist Papers." "Nothing is more certain
than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it
some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite power^."'^
John Locke's writings also played a vital role in the development of
religious liberty during the founding generation.
Jefferson carefully read and made notes on Locke's The Reasonableness of Christianity and his Letters on Religious Toleration.
Major portions of Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom derived from passages in Locke's first Letter Concerning
Toleration. Jefferson's bill, in turn, was one of the major precursors of the religion clauses of the first amendment.8"
James Madison, a friend and political ally of Thomas Jefferson and the
primary architect of the Constitution and First Amendment, was a vocal
advocate for religious liberty and the floor leader for Jefferson's bill in Vir78. U.S. Const. preamble (emphasis added).
79. U.S. Const. art. I, Q: 8; U.S. Const. amend. IX-X.
80. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3.
81. The Federalist Papers were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John
Jay, and published in the popular press in New York to win support of the Constitution in the
state's ratifying convention.
82. The Federalist No. 2 (John Jay), in The Federalist: A Commentary on the Cotistitution of
the United States 7, 8 (Robert Scigliano ed., The Modem Library 2001); see also The Federalist
No. I (Alexander Hamilton), in The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United
States, supra n. 82, at 3 , 3 ("It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to
the people of this country, to decide by their conduct and example, the important question,
whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on
accident and force.").
83. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1430-31 (1990) [hereinafter Origins and Historical
Understanding].

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

642

[Vol. 3:3

ginia's struggle with this issue.84 Writing in support of this bill, Madison
stated:
[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, "that religion
or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence." The Religion then of every man must be left to
the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of
every man to exercise it as these may dictate.85
Thus, John Locke's philosophy is an "indispensable part of the intellectual backdrop" for the framing of the First Amendment religious liberty
clauses.86
3.

The American Baptists and Other Religious Dissenters

Baptists and other religious dissenters built upon the religious beliefs
of Roger Williams and the liberal political philosophy of John Locke.
Throughout much of the colonial period, religious dissenters were persecuted in the assessment of religious taxes and in the right to preach and
practice their religion by the religious establishments in New England and
the southern colonies.87 During the Great Awakening, traveling preachers
and revivals led many individuals to abandon the established churches in
favor of these dissenting religions, leading the established churches to increase their persecution of religious dissenter^.'^
This persecution led many dissenting religious leaders to the realization that, in order to maintain religious purity and ensure the protection of
religious liberty, civil government must be separated from religious institutions. Thus, in addition to supporting the destruction of Virginia's religious
establishment with Thomas Jefferson's Statute for Religious F r e e d ~ m , ~ ~
American Baptists were vocal proponents of the inclusion of the no religious test clause in the Constitution. The Reverend Isaac Backus, a distinguished Baptist minister, echoed many of Roger Williams' views during the
Massachusetts ratifying convention: "Nothing is more evident, both in reason and The Holy Scriptures, than that religion is ever a matter between
God and individuals; and, therefore, no man or men can impose any religious test without invading the essential prerogatives of our Lord Jesus
Chri~t."~'Reverend Backus also stated, "the imposing of religious tests had
84. Id.
85. James Madison, Memorial and Rernonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in Jefferson & Madison on Separation of Church and State, supra n. 38, at 68.
86. McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra n. 83, at 1430-31.
87. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1, at 113-15.
88. Id. at 116.
89. Id. at 119; Thomas Jefferson, Drqji of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, in
Jefferson & Madison on Separation of Church and State, supra n. 38, at 48.
90. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. I , at 39-40.
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been the greatest engine of tyranny in the world."g1 The Reverend Samuel
Langdon repeated similar beliefs at the New Hampshire convention, stating
that he took "a general view of religion as unconnected with and detached
from the civil power-that [as] it was an obligation between God and his
creatures, the civil authority could not interfere without infringing upon the
rights of c o n s ~ i e n c e . " ~ ~
4.

The Philosophy of ChurcWState Separation

As the philosophies of Roger Williams, John Locke, and the colonial
religious dissenters illustrate, the separation of civic government from religious institutions serves three important interests: (1) the protection of democratic government from religion; (2) the protection of religion from
government; and (3) the protection of each individual's freedom of
conscience.
Separating governmental and religious institutions provides mutual
protection to both democratic governance and religious doctrine. Although
most Americans of the founding generation believed that religion, by instilling morals and preserving a stable public order, was an essential component of a functional civil society,93 religion was historically used as a
governing tool. By linking governmental policy to the word of God, rulers
were able to link civil obedience to the religious promise of eternal salvation or damnation. The new democratic republican government created by
the Constitution, however, required a new perspective on this link. Religion, which is primarily concerned with the word and command of God,
focuses on absolute moral rights and wrongs. While this is consistent with
monarchial government, where the king's word is also absolute, it is inconsistent with the compromise necessary for successful republican self-government in a large population with diverse policy and moral perspectives. A
strong link between self-government and robust religious institutions would
require the sacrifice of either effective government or unbiased religion; by
separating these institutions, both government and religion may be individually effective in their distinct spheres.
Separating religion from the coercive force of government is also necessary to protect each individual's freedom of conscience. People form religious institutions to effectuate the salvation of their souls by worshipping
God according to the dictates of their individual conscience. This fundamental purpose of religious institutions therefore requires free and honest
acceptance of religious belief, which is hampered when government influences religious choice through coercion or preference of religion. Thus,
91. Id. at 40.
92. Id. at 39.
93. E.g. Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38
Creighton L. Rev. 761, 775 (2005).
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civil government is properly limited to the regulation of interactions among
individuals to protect their civil, earthly interests.
When the text of the establishment clause is considered with its philosophical foundation, it is plain the noncoercion and nonpreference interpretations crumble. The preference of religion generally exceeds civil
government's limited legitimate role in governing the earthly affairs of
men, requires the same compromise of either effective governance or pure
religion as the preference of particular religious sects, and hampers religion's proper function in facilitating the salvation of souls through uncorrupted worship according to each individual's conscience.
C.

The Federal Structure of the New American Government

The American Constitution utilizes two distinct mechanisms to protect
individual liberty from the new national government: (1) the governmental
powers were divided between the new federal government and the governments of the several states; and (2) the powers of the federal government
were divided between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.94
The first of these mechanisms-federalism-developed
from the postRevolution experience under the Articles of Confederation, offered affirmative liberty protections, and addressed the practical circumstances of the
era.
Following the successful Revolution, each of the former colonies became independent, sovereign states. On March 1, 1781, these individual
states entered "a firm league of friendship" to address matters of national
importance under the Articles of C~nfederation.~~
Unlike the subsequent
Constitution, which derived its authority directly from the citizens under it,
the national government under the Articles of Confederation existed by
agreement of the sovereign states.96 The Articles of Confederation, however, quickly proved ineffective in addressing the interests of the new
nation.
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or
GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE
CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDU94. See The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), in The Federalist: A Commentary on the
Constitution of the United Stutes, supra n. 82, at 330, 333 ("In the compound republic of America,
the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the
same time that each will be controlled by itself.").
95. Articles of Confederation an. 111.
96. Compare U.S. Const. preamble ("We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America" (emphasis added)) with Articles of
Confederation art. I11 ("The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with
each other.' (emphasis added)).
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ALS of whom they consist. . . . The consequence of this is, that
though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are
laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet
in practice they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their option.97
To better address the national concerns while continuing to protect individual liberty and state sovereignty, the Constitution expands the power
of the federal government while limiting its authority to the narrow spheres
of national interest. On issues directly impacting the nation generally (for
example, national defense and interstate commerce), the Constitution delegates broad authority to the federal g o ~ e r n m e n t Over
. ~ ~ other matters, the
states retain the governmental authority.
Assigning governmental authority to the smallest, most local level of
government able to effectively address the matter protects individual liberty
by allowing the greatest number of citizens to live according to their personal beliefs. This principle is exemplified by religious regulation in the
early United States. Massachusetts and Virginia utilized dramatically different approaches to religi~n.'~If the central government exercised authority
to legislate in this sphere, a nationwide majority would be empowered to
adopt one, or neither, of these distinct approaches. By restricting the central
government's authority in this sphere and leaving the matter to the several
states, by contrast, a majority in each individual state could legislate and
live according to their unique vision. Thus, the First Amendment utilizes a
dual structure to protect religious freedom-it contains a substantive religious liberty provision guaranteeing the free exercise of religion,lM) and a
structure, as originally understood by the founding generation, to preserve
this right by reserving religious regulation to the individual states.lO'
97. The Federalist No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), in The Federalist: A Commentary on the
Constitution of the United States, supra n. 82, at 85, 89.
98. E.g. U.S. Const. art. I, 5 8, cl. 1 (federal authority to raise money and pay debts to
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States), cl. 3 (federal power to
regulate international and interstate commerce), cl. 11-16 (federal power to declare war, raise an
army and navy, and call up and train the militia); see also The Federalist Nos. 3, 4 (John Jay), in
The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, supra n. 82, at 13-22
(federal government better suited to avoid hostilities); The Federalist No. I I (Alexander Hamilton), in The Federalist: A Comrnentary on the Constitution of the United States, supra n. 82, at
62-69 (federal government better suited to regulate commerce).
99. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment, supra n. 28, at 21 16-2126. Massachusetts had a system of local establishment, under which each community voted on the church that
would be the recognized church and receive the funds collected under the religious tax. Virginia,
by contrast, abolished all religious establishment with Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom in 1786.
100. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion].").
101. Id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."); Lietzau,
supra n. 14, at 1191-1 194 (proposing this dual structure of religious liberty protection and advocating the rollback of establishment clause incorporation).

646

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:3

In addition to the affirmative protection of religious liberty, the prohibition of federal religious regulation served important practical considerations in winning support for the Constitution. America was populated by
many distinct religious sects and denominations with highly-divergent beliefs about interactions with broader society. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, states also had several distinct approaches to religious
regulation. Because of the difficulty in compromising deeply-held, personal
convictions, such as religious beliefs, and the history of religious persecution under the highly-centralized British Empire, the only consensus available in creating an already-controversial federal government was leaving
religious regulation completely in the hands of the individual states.lo2
A federalist foundation for the establishment clause is supported by the
constitutional text and its legislative history. The First Amendment expressly applies only to the federal government.'03 While debating proposed
constitutional amendments, Congress considered and rejected an amendment applying many of the First Amendment protections to the states: "no
State shall infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of
speech or of the press, nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal cases."'04
The rejection of this proposal indicates an intent to leave the regulation of
these matters to the individual states. The intent to restrain the federal government, but not the states, from establishing religion is especially clearCongress did not even consider applying a version of the establishment
clause to the states.
102. E.g. Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 11 13, 1132-1 134 (1988) ("Given this widespread and deep division, how could Congress and the ratifying state legislatures have reached agreement on the establishment clause? It
was supported, after all, both by separationists and by those who were committed to programs of
state-sponsored religion. These various political actors simply could not have agreed on a general
principle governing the relationship of religion and government, whether it be the principle endorsed in Everson [v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)l or any other. If the establishment
clause had embraced such a principle, it would not have been enacted. What united the representatives of all the states, both in Congress and in the ratifying legislatures, was a much more narrow
purpose: to make it plain that Congress was not to legislate on the subject of religion, thereby
leaving the matter of church-state relations to the individual states. This purpose honored the antiestablishment policies of states such as Virginia, but it also protected the existing state establishments from congressional interference."); Green, supra n. 93, at 767 ("Although the ultimate
phrasing of the Establishment Clause may indicate the presence of federalism concerns, such was
not primary or overriding impetus behind the call for or drafting of the First Amendment. Rather,
the Establishment Clause reflects broad substantive values upon which a majority of early Americans could agree. While those who drafted and ratified the Establishment Clause may have disagreed over the precise meaning of 'nonestablishment' and its day to day application to issues
such as days of Thanksgiving or Sabbath laws (in the same way that modem observers diverge
over issues such as vouchers and the public posting of the Ten Commandments), they shared
common, broad ideals that found their way into the language of the First Amendment: freedom of
conscience; no compelled support of religion; no delegation of government authority to religious
institutions; and equal treatment of all sects.").
103. U.S Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law. . . ." (emphasis added)).
104. 1 Annals of Cong. at 783.
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The federalist interpretation is also consistent with the philosophical
developments during the founding generation. As noted above, America
was in the middle of a dramatic philosophical shift away from close ties
between civil government and religion. While Virginia had already adopted
the Lockean perspective on religious freedom, as demonstrated in James
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments'o5
and the adoption of Thomas Jefferson's Statute for Religious Freedom,lo6
many New England states retained established churches into the early nineteenth century.'07 The only practical method of protecting existing state
regulations until the emerging vision of disestablishment and church-state
separation gained universal acceptance was to leave religious regulation exclusively to the discretion of the individual states.lo8
The federalist understanding of the religious liberty clauses supports
the neutrality interpretation of the establishment clause. Prohibiting only
federal government coercion or preference of particular sects would not
completely remove the national government from the religious sphere-the
governmental preference of religion generally would conflict with states
adopting the Roger Williams or John Locke philosophies of governmentreligion interaction. Similarly, the strict separation interpretation treats religion different than other topics. For the federal government to be completely removed from this sphere, it must be blind to religion and treat
religious speech as it would any other speech.
Federalism was a central component of America's new government.
The structure offered affirmative protection of individual liberty by dividing
governmental authority among multiple political centers. It also allowed
smaller groups of individuals to each live according to their individual political beliefs-even when the policies of different groups conflicted-and
allowed individual states to serve as laboratories for new policy advances.
Practically, federalism allowed the several independent states to compromise on the creation of a new central government by completely removing
certain issues from the authority of the central government. The establishment and free exercise clauses are examples of this compromise and affirmative protection of liberty. The assurance of government neutrality on
religious questions was necessary to ensure the continued vitality of these
protections.
D. America's Early Struggles with ChurcWState Relations

The governing behavior of the early leaders-many of whom participated in the drafting of the text-is also useful in understanding the original
105.
106.
107.
108.

Madison, supra n. 85, at 68.
Jefferson, supra n. 89, at 48.
McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment, supra n. 28, at 2126.
E.g. Conkle, supra n. 102, at 1132-34.
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intent of the religious liberty clauses. This historical evidence, although not
unanimous, supports the neutrality understanding of the establishment
clause.
1.

The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution

When the American Constitution was drafted, political documents routinely referenced God as the source for the authority and wisdom of the
government. The Declaration of Independence famously stated: "We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
The Articles of Confedare Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happines~."'~~
Most of the early
eration credited "the Great Governor of the W ~ r l d . " " ~
state constitutions also overtly acknowledged God and the necessity of
Christian morality for civil order."' As one critic of the proposed Constitution noted, "there was never a nation in the world whose government was
not circumscribed by religi~n.""~
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention, on the other hand, created an intentionally secular Constitution as the foundation of the new federal government. In sharp contrast to the typical practices for the period, the
Constitution makes no religious reference.l13 Such a dramatic departure
could not have been unintentional; it was also not unnoticed. In 1789, a
group of religious leaders from New England sent a letter to President
George Washington, who had presided over the Constitutional Convention,
"complaining that the Constitution lacked any reference to the only true
God and Jesus Christ, who he hath sent."'14 Washington replied that "'the
path of true piety is so plain as to require but little political direction.' Not
the state and its institutions, . . . but ministers of the gospel were to further
the 'advancement of true religi~n."'"~ Read together, this evidence
strongly suggests that the consensus among the framers of the Constitution,
even if it was not unanimously shared throughout society, was that God was
intentionally omitted from the Constitution.
The Constitution was also religiously controversial because the one
religious provision in the document outlawed religious tests for officers of
109. Declaration of lrtdeperiderice [¶ 21 (1776).
110. Articles of Confederation art. XIII, 'j 2.
1 1 1. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1, at 28.
112. Aristocrotis, The Governmerit o f Nature Delineated or an Exact Picture of the New Federal Constitution, in The Complete Antifederalist vol. 3, 196, 205 (Herbert J. Storing ed., U. of
Chi. Press 1981).
113. The Constitution does state: "Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the
States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven
hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth."
U.S. Const. art. VII. This was not a religious statement, however, but a method of measuring
dates.
114. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1. at 102 (internal quotations omitted).
115. Id.
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the federal government."6 This provision was not controversial among delegates to the Constitutional Convention.'17 Among the rest of the country,
however, the issue was not so clear; eleven of the thirteen states had religious tests for public offices in their constitution^."^ Delegates to ratifying
conventions across the country expressed concern that this clause would
open control of the national government to atheists, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and Quakers.Il9 Critics viewed the no religious test clause as the embodiment of a general rejection of Chri~tianity.'~'This criticism led to
specific proposals to amend the Constitution by adding religious references
and by requiring a religious test for federal office."' Many Americans also
spoke out in support of the secular government and no religious test clause.
These people made religious arguments supporting separation of civil government from religious institution^'^^ and practical arguments that the wide
variety of religious sects in America made religious tests absurd.'23
The proponents of the secular government ultimately prevailed; the
Preamble continues to be godless and the no religious test clause remains
intact. The vigorous debate surrounding these issues clearly demonstrates
that the founding generation was keenly aware of the arguments in support
of and in opposition to the secular nature of the proposed federal government and suggests a clear decision to pursue the policy of separation.
2.

The Early Years under the Constit~ition

During the first twenty years of the new nation, Americans struggled
to apply the proper relationship between the government and religious institutions. One early conflict centered on the issuance of proclamations declaring days of fasting and thanksgiving. The nation's first two presidentsGeorge Washington and John Adams-issued such proclamations without
controversy.lZ4 Thomas Jefferson-the third president-refused
on the
ground that such proclamations violated the C o n s t i t u t i ~ n . Jefferson
'~~
ex-

I 16. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[Nlo religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to
any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
117. Krarnnick & Moore. supra n. I, at 29. According to Maryland delegate Luther Martin,
the no religious test clause was "adopted by a very great majority of the convention, and without
much debate." James Madison's notes indicate that only one state voted no and one state delegation was divided on the question of the no religious test clause.
118. Id. at 29-30.
119. Id. at 32.
120. Id. at 34-37.
12 1. Id. at 37.
122. Id. at 39.
123. Id. at 42.
124. Id. at 96.
125. Responding to a request by a group of Baptists in Danbury, Connecticut to declare a day
of fasting for national reconciliation following his bitter campaign with Adams, Jefferson stated:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God.
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign
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plained his perspective on the religious liberty clauses in his second inaugural address:
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is
placed by the [Clonstitution independent of the powers of the
general government. I have therefore undertaken, on no occasion,
to prescribe the religious exercises suited to it; but have left them
as the [Clonstitution found them, under the direction and discipline of state or church authorities.lZ6
The fourth president-James Madison-gave in to political pressures
surrounding the War of 18 12 and reluctantly made one religious proclamation, although his draft was crafted as innocuously as possible.12' In 1832,
well into his retirement, Madison expressed regret he had caved to political
temptation and issued the p r o ~ l a m a t i o n . ' ~ ~
The early ambiguity surrounding the proper relationship between civil
government and the federal government extended beyond presidential proclamations. On one hand, Congress appropriated money to pay for missionaries among the Native Americans. On the other hand, the Senate
unanimously approved a treaty, apparently with little controversy,
providing:
As the government of the United States of America is not in any
sense founded on the Christian religion-as it has in itself no
character of enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquility of
Musselmen [Muslims],- and as the said States never entered into
any war or act of hostility against any Mahometan [Islamic] nation, it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony
existing between the two c o u n t r i e ~ . ' ~ ~
It is not clear whether any inferences may be drawn from these governmental actions. In appropriating money for missionaries, Congress may
have been purchasing civil services; religious actors were generally the only
providers of education and social services in early America. Likewise, any
insight into the founders' mindset on the relationship between the federal
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature
should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.
Jefferson, supra n. 38, at 163.
126. Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address, in Jefferson & Madison on Separation of
Church and State, supra n. 38, at 178.
127. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1, at 105-06. After declaring war with Great Britain in
1812, Congress requested a national day of fasting "with religious solemnity as a day of public
humiliation and prayer." Id. at 105. Madison eventually acceded and issued such a proclamation
on July 23, 1813. See James Madison, A Proclamation of Thanksgiving, in Jefferson & Mudison
on Separation of Church and State, supra n. 38, at 207.
128. Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1, at 106.
129. Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States of America and the Bey and
Subjects of Tripoli of Barbary art. XI (Nov. 4, 1796, ratified June 7, 1797), available at http://
www.yale.edu/lawweblavalonldiplomacyhrbaryar1796t.htm(accessed Oct. 14, 2006).
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government and religion from the Senate's unanimous passage of a declaration that the United States is not "founded on the Christian religion" is
tempered by the context of the statement in a peace treaty with a nation
founded on another religion. Finally, these controversies were relatively minor and not sufficiently contentious to engage the nation in a broad debate
about the proper relationship between civil government and religious
institutions.
3.

The Sunday Mail Debates

The nation did become embroiled in a broad debate about the secular
nature of the federal government when the local postmaster of a small
Pennsylvania town was expelled from his church for opening the post office
for a few hours on Sundays as a convenience for churchgoers from neighboring ~ i 1 l a g e s . In
l ~ ~1810, Congress responded with legislation requiring
the daily (including Sundays) transportation of mail and operation of every
post office.'" Congress was immediately inundated with petitions stating
the statute made "it necessary to violate the command of God" and "His
justice will demand that adequate punishment be initiated on our common
country."'32 Postal officials argued that frequent mail movement was essential to the nation's economy and national defense.'" This initial skirmish
over Sunday postal operations was ultimately won by those supporting a
secular federal government-although opponents attempted to repeal the
1810 law, the legislation died in 1817 without being brought to a vote. 13"
A new campaign to stop Sunday postal operations began with the creation of the General Union for the Promotion of the Christian Sabbath in
May 1828.'" Learning from the earlier failure based on commercial considerations, the group organized merchants who supported their cause'36
and required members to boycott companies carrying mail on sun day^.'^^
The petitions that supported repeal of the law made both anti-federalist13'
and r e l i g i o u ~ arguments.
'~~
Proponents of Sunday mail delivery, rather than
relying solely on commercial considerations as they had in the earlier struggle, focused on the secular nature of the federal government. This was em130. Kramnick & Moore, supru n. I, at 132.
131. Id. at 133.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 134.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 135.
136. Id.
137. Id. The postal service contracted with passenger canying companies to transport mail. Id.
at 134.
138. Id. at 136 ("The general Government has not the constitutional power to authorize violation of the Sabbath.").
139. Id. (The United States is "a Christian Community, where all the chartered rights and
political institutions, as well as the legislative provisions of the country, recognize the authority of
the Christian religion.").
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bodied in a report by General Richard M. Johnson, chair of the Senate
Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads, entitled Report on the Subject of Mails on the Sabbath.14' General Johnson's report focused on the
unconstitutionality of " 'the principle that the Legislature was a proper tribunal to determine what are the laws of God"' because Congress is "a civil
institution, wholly destitute of religious a~thority."'~'
The report continued:
"The framers of the Constitution recognized the eternal principle that man's
relation with God is above human legislation and his rights of conscience
~ n a l i e n a b l e . " 'The
~ ~ federal government lacks the authority to "define God
or point out to the citizen one religious duty," including recognition of the
Sabbath.'43
Advocates of a separation between government and religion were initially successful in preserving Sunday mail delivery. Ultimately, however,
new technologies eroded the necessity of Sunday mail service; in 1912,
Congress officially closed all post offices on Sunday.144
4.

Understanding America's Early History of Religious Separation

The history, although not definitive, suggests the founding generation
intended to create a secular federal government and interpreted the Constitution as prohibiting religious coercion, the preference of particular religious groups, and the preference of religion generally. This history also
suggests the founding generation did not intend a strict separation where the
government merely places religion on an equal footing with nonreligious
beliefs or speech.
Thomas Jefferson was one of the founding generation's most vocal
and most principled advocates of church-state separation. At first glance,
his reliance on God in the Declaration of Independence as the source of the
"unalienable rights" appears entirely inconsistent with his separationist
principles. This understanding, however, does not properly account for the
Lockean philosophy or practical differences between the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Jefferson, like Locke, was personally religious and believed that God was the source of human rights.'45 Both men
140. Id. at 138-39.
141. Id. at 139 (quoting Johnson).
142. Id. at 140.
143. Id. at 141 (internal quotations omitted).
144. Id. at 142.
145. See Locke, Second Treatise of Government, supra n. 71, at 101, 5 4 ("there being nothing
more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same
advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another
without subordination or subjection; unless the Lord and Master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear
appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty."); Declaration of Independence [q[
21 (1776) ("We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and
the Pursuit of Happiness.").
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also believed that religion was intensely personal and outside the sphere of
l ~ ~ incorporating religious principles
legitimate government a ~ t h 0 r i t y .Thus,
into the Declaration of Independence-a persuasive, rather than governing,
document justifying the American independence movement and focused on
winning the support of colonists and foreign governments--was entirely
appropriate. The Constitution, however, was a document establishing and
setting the boundaries for a civil government, and religious references
would be inappropriate to adherents of Locke's philosophy on church-state
separation.
America's early history includes two major national debates about the
proper interaction between government and religious institutions and several instances of minor political actions that do not reflect consistent principles on the subject. America represented an experiment applying the stilldeveloping philosophy of religious liberty through church-state separation.
The minor actions of the early republic suggest a nation struggling to apply
its philosophical principles to real-world governance. In the two instances
in which the national attention was focused on the issue, America chose
governmental neutrality toward religion generally. In both the constitutional
ratification and the Sunday mail debates, America rejected attempts to link
religion and government in circumstances that would not have coerced religious practice or preferred any of the particular Christian sects. When the
national attention was elsewhere, however, the governing behavior lapsed
from the constitutional neutrality principles toward the traditional churchstate connection present throughout the founding generation's previous experience. This hypothesis is supported by James Madison's issuance of the
Thanksgiving proclamation: when the nation was focused on war with England, Madison's religious liberty principles bowed; when he later reflected
on his action, however, he realized his error.
These lapses favor a government neutrality construction over a strict
separation view of the establishment clause. Strict separation draws a
bright, easy-to-follow line: government may not act in any way touching
religion. Government neutrality, in contrast, requires greater thought because some actions that touch religion without prefemng it are allowed. If
government actions were uncontroversial, officials would have to specifically remember to analyze the establishment clause implications; where this
was not done, actions violating the neutrality principle could escape notice.
The history of some governmental action touching religion suggests all
such relationships were not offensive to the First Amendment's drafters.

146. See Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra n. 7 4 , at 219 ("Nor can any power be
vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people; because no man can so far abandon the care
of his own salvation as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether prince or subject, to
prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall embrace."); Kramnick & Moore, supra n. 1, at 96.
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The drafters and ratifiers of the establishment clause undertook an
original experiment-the protection of religious liberty through the separation of religion from civil government. As the world's first modem democratic republic, civil government needed protection from uncompromising
religious principles. The long history of religious establishments also
demonstrated the need to protect religious doctrine from political corruption
and to protect the individual right, and responsibility, to practice religion
according to one's own conscience. Finally, the practical reality in the
adoption of the Constitution required that, at least until the philosophy of
separation fully emerged throughout the nation, the exclusive authority to
regulate within the religious sphere be left to the individual states.
Professor Michael Perry defines the nonestablishment norm, inherent
in the establishment clause, as prohibiting government from acting "for the
purpose of favoring any church in relation to any other church on the basis
of the view that the favored church is, as a church, as a community of faith,
better along one or another dimension of value-truer, for example, or
more efficacious spiritually, or more authentically A m e r i ~ a n . " This
' ~ ~ definition has one fundamental flaw-the First Congress unambiguously considered, and rejected, the nonpreference view. According to the original
understanding of the establishment clause, government is prohibited from
favoring both specific religious groups and religion generally. Modifying
Professor Perry's definition to reflect this original intent, the establishment
clause prohibits government actions from preferring any religion over another religion, or over no religion at all, on the basis that the favored religious belief is better along one or another dimension of value-for example,
truer, more efficacious spiritually, or more authentically American.
The original intent of the establishment clause thus required official
government silence on religious matters. The government may not write
religious beliefs into the text of any statute or into any findings or policies
supporting a statutory policy. Even general religious references necessarily
exhibit preference for, and place the official government stamp on, religion
itself.
Prohibiting government speech that takes positions on religious
questions prevents these private speakers from bringing government power to bear in their efforts to persuade or convert; protects all views about religion from having to compete with the
power of government promoting some other view; protects everyone from being coerced or manipulated into attending religious
observances they would not freely choose to attend; and in gen147. Perry, supra n. 36, at 566.
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eral, prevents government from either encouraging or discouraging any religious belief or practice.14'
It is undoubtedly true that religious rationales were written into many
statutes in early America-even Thomas Jefferson, the most separationist
of the founding fathers, cited a religious foundation for his famous Statute
for Religious Freedom: "Almighty God hath created the mind free, and
manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain by making it altogether
insusceptible of restraint."149This example, however, merely demonstrates
the emerging nature of the separation philosophy. Jefferson's statute was
drafted and adopted years before the establishment clause. To take a principled stand refusing to use the primary tools of the period, without the agreement of all political actors, would only ensure defeat. Effective reformers
must use the tools of the existing system to change the existing system.
While the First Amendment requires official government silence, it
does not require complete separation. Congress may not write religious
motivations into the United States Code. Individual members of Congress,
however, may discuss their personal religious beliefs in connection with
any political issue without offending the First Amendment. These statements are no different from any other motivations for specific policy decisions, and represent the voice of the individual rather than the government.
Balancing of official government silence with individual freedom of
speech, even when the speaker is an elected official, ensures that government does not influence individual religious choice by preventing any religion from becoming the official or unofficial religion of the nation.

The establishment clause was drafted to prohibit federal government
actions that prefer any religion over any other religion, or over no religion
at all, based on the view that the favored religious belief is better along one
or another dimension of value (for example, that the religious belief is truer,
more efficacious spiritually, or more authentically American).lso This provision, at a basic level, requires official federal government silence on all
religious matters. By inserting the words "under God" into the Pledge of
Allegiance in federal statute, the United States Congress violated the origi-

-

pp

148. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 Ham. L. Rev. 155, 218-19 (2004) [hereinafter The Pledge of Allegiance].
149. Thomas Jefferson, Drafr of the Virginia Statute for Religrous Freedom, in Jefferson &
Madison on Separation of Church and State, supra n. 89. The second clause of this quote was
deleted from the version ultimately adopted by the Virginia Assembly in 1786.
150. See supra at $ 1I.E.
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nal understanding of the establishment clause by exhibiting a preference of
particular religious beliefs and of religion generally.
Proponents of the continued iiiclusion of "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance rely on two primary justifications to overcome this constitutional violation: (1) that "under God" does not really have a religious meaning in the context of the Pledge of Allegiance; and (2) that the phrase is a
legitimate recognition of the limited authority of the federal government.
The first justification ignores the history and context of the words; the second is contradicted by the Lockean social contract philosophy underlying
the Constitution. Thus, neither justification cures the phrase's plain violation of the original understanding of the establishment clause.
A.

Congress's 1954 Addition of "under God" to the Pledge of
Allegiance Exhibits Federal Governmental Preference of
Specijic Religious Values, and of Religion Generally, as
Authentically American

The plain meaning of the words "under God" includes three facets of
religious doctrine. First, the words are a statement that there is a God-a
most basic, and most fundamental, religious belief. Second, the singular
"God" is a statement there is only one God. Finally, the words define one
aspect of the nature of God-stating that the nation is under God implies
that God endorses and exercises supervisory authority over it. Thus, the two
simple words embody governmental preference for religion over atheism or
agnosticism, monotheist religions over polytheist religions, and the belief in
an active God over the belief in a passive Creator.15' Inserting the words
"under God" into the Pledge of Allegiance exhibits Congress's religious
preference by equating the three implicit religious doctrines with authentic
American values. The Pledge of Allegiance is an affirmation of personal
loyalty to the United States and its most fundamental characteristics. "To
recite the Pledge is . . . to swear allegiance to the values for which the flag
stands: unity, indivisibility, liberty, justice, and-since 1954-monotheism.fl152 By adding religious doctrine to this list of fundamental characteristics, the Pledge forces atheists and agnostics, polytheists, and citizens who
believe in a passive God into an impossible choice: be perceived as an inferior, disloyal citizen; become a hypocrite by reciting false beliefs; or conform to the congressionally-sanctioned religious doctrine.
The legislative history of the 1954 Act unequivocally demonstrates
Congress's intent to link religious doctrine with authentic American values.
In support of the legislation, Congress stated, "our Nation was founded on a
fundamental belief in God."lS3 Congress also cited religious belief as the
1.51. Laycock, The Pledge of Allegiance, supra n. 148, at 226.
152. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607.
1.53. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; see also Sen. Rpt. 83-1313.
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distinguishing characteristic between America's core principles and Communism, thus making this one value the most authentically A m e r i ~ a n . In
'~~
signing the bill, President Eisenhower described the new law as "the dedication of our nation and our people to the Almighty," and stated that, "[tlo
anyone who truly loves America, nothing could be more inspiring than to
contemplate this rededication . . . to our country's true meaning."'" Congress thus explicitly sought to link monotheistic religious belief in an active
God with the duties of a patriotic American citizen through this legislation.
B. In Arguing that "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is
Historical or Ceremonial, Rather than Religious, Proponents of
the Phrase Ignore the Plain Legislative History and the
Context of the Pledge of Allegiance

Many defenders of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance argue the
phrase is historical or ceremonial, rather than religious. Some argue the
phrase "merely recognize[s] the historical fact that our Nation was believed
to have been founded 'under God."'156 Others believe the words represent
ceremonial deism-religious references "serv[ing], in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and
encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society."15' Such references are "protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny
chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious content."'58
The historical and ceremonial justifications ignore the legislative history of the 1954 Act inserting "under G o d into the Pledge of Allegiance. In
passing this legislation, Congress did cite a long list of religious references-from the 1620 Mayflower Compact through the 1864 inscription of
"In God We Trust" on American coins-to support a claim that America
was founded on Christian p r i n ~ i p 1 e s . lThe
~ ~ remainder of the legislative
history, however, reveals Congress's true intention-to portray the United
States as presently characterized by, not historically founded upon, Christian principles. "Under G o d was added to the Pledge of Allegiance at the
height of the Cold War because Congress believed America's religious
character was its fundamental difference with "the atheistic and materialistic" Communism of the Soviet Union.160 As President Eisenhower recognized in signing the legislation:
154. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; see also Sen. Rpt. 83-131 3.
155. Eisenhower, Statement by the President upon Signing Bill to Include the Words "Under
God" in the Pledge to the Flag, supra n. 26, at 563.
156. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
157. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).
158. Id. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; Sen. Rpt. 83-1313.
160. H.R. Rpt. 83-1693; Sen. Rpt. 83.1313.
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From this day forward, the millions of our school children will
daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural
school house, the dedication of our nation and our people to the
Almighty. To anyone who truly loves America, nothing could be
more inspiring than to contemplate this rededication of our youth,
on each school morning, to our country's true meaning. . . . In this
way we are reaffirming the transcendence of religious faith in
America's heritage and future; in this way we shall constantly
strengthen those spiritual weapons which forever will be our
country's most powerful resource in peace or in war.161
Thus, the legislative history contradicts the argument that "under God"
merely recognizes the historical fact of America's purported religious foundation and that the words are ceremonial and lack religious meaning-the
words were inserted precisely because of their statement of the United
States' present religious character.
The historical and ceremonial justification also ignores the context of
the words. Some religious references, such as the use of "in the Year of our
Lord" to date the Constitution, do not have a religious meaning.'62 Many of
the other historical examples cited, including the Declaration of Independence and Gettysburg Address, were not statements made by the government in its official capacity, and therefore do not violate the principle of
governmental n e ~ t r a 1 i t y . l ~
In~ a dissenting opinion of the Amended
Newdow opinion, Judge O'Scannlain writes: "Most assuredly, to pledge allegiance to flag and country is a patriotic act. . . . The fact the Pledge is
infused with an undoubtedly religious reference does not change the nature
16 1. Eisenhower, Statement by the President upon Signing Bill to Include the Words "Under
God" in the Pledge to the Flag, supra n. 26, at 563.
162. The use of "in the Year of our Lord" was the customary method of counting years in
colonial America. This system was introduced by Dionysius Exiguus, a Scythian monk, in about
527. He designated years based upon his calculation of the year of Christ's birth. The years following this date are designated Anno Domini (latin for "In the Year of the Lord"), which is
commonly abbreviated as A.D. This system of chronology spread across Europe, with England
among the first areas to adopt its use-this system was found in Saxon texts dating to the seventh
century. In western society, including mathematical and scientific communities, the use of A.D.
continues to be the widely accepted method of counting years. See John Gerard, Chronology,
General, I11 Catholic Encyclopedia 738 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds., Robert Appleton Co.
1908). There are many non-religious reasons for adopting a uniform system of dating and chronology, even a uniform system utilizing a religious reference. For example, the British Parliament
recognized many of these reasons in switching from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar in 175 1,
including: (1) "frequent Mistakes . . . occasioned in the Dates of Deeds, and other Writings," and
(2) the "general Convenience to Merchants, and other Persons corresponding with other Nations
and Countries." British Calendar Act, 1751, 24 Geo. 2 c. 23 (Eng.). The triumph of uniformity
over religious principle in this area is demonstrated by the British adoption of the Gregorian
calendar, which was introduced by Pope Gregory XIII, despite the religious conflict between
Great Britain and the Roman Catholic Church.
163. The Declaration of Independence was drafted as a persuasive document to gain the support of colonists and foreign governments. The Gettysburg Address was a speech by an individual
member of the government, not a statement by the government acting through its governing
power.
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of the act itself."164 It is precisely this point-the inclusion of religious
doctrine in an officially-sanctioned, personal affirmation of patriotism and
obedience to the nation and its core values-that offends the original intention of the establishment ~ 1 a u s e . The
l ~ ~ words, as written in the statute,
require the reciter to pledge allegiance to "one Nation under God," not to
"one Nation founded by religious believers9'-if we do not accept the plain
meaning of the words in the Pledge of Allegiance, what value does it have
as a loyalty oath or patriotic exercise?
C. Although the Power of the Federal Government is Constitutionally
Limited, the American People, Not God, are the Recognized
Limiting Force

Professor Thomas Berg offers an alternative rationale supporting the
inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance-the phrase
expresses the idea that government is a limited institution, subject
to standards of authority higher than itself. "Under God" expresses the idea that the rights of persons-the "liberty and justice" guaranteed to all-are inalienable, stemming from a source
higher than the nation or any other human a ~ t h 0 r i t y . l ~ ~
The phrase is permissible, maybe even necessary, because it recognizes "a religious rationale for the ideal of limited government and inalienable rights."16'
The first premise of this rationale is correct-the United States government, under the Constitution, is limited and subject to a higher authority.
This higher authority, however, is not God. The drafters of the Constitution
were well-acquainted with government "constrained" by God-centuries of
European monarchs ruled under the divine right of kings, which theorized
that monarchs derived their authority directly from God,'68 and did not recognize limited government or inalienable rights. The new American government was based on a new political theory-John Locke's social contract
theory. Government is created by men for their mutual benefit, and is subject to their continued consent to be governed. The Constitution itself rec164. Newdow, 328 F.3d at 478 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
165. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in the Original Newdow decision:
The recitation that ours is a nation 'under God' is not a mere acknowledgment that many
Americans believe in a deity. Nor is it merely descriptive of the undeniable historical
significance of religion in the founding of the Republic. Rather, the phrase 'one nation
under God' in the context of the Pledge is normative. To recite the Pledge is not to
describe the United States; instead, it is to swear allegiance to the values for which the
flag stands: unity, indivisibility, liberty, justice, and-since 1954-monotheism.
Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607 (9th Cir. 2002).
166. Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol.
41, 52 (2003).
167. Id. at 67.
168. E.g. Edward Rubin, The Conceptual Explanation for Legislative Failure, 30 L. & Soc.
lnquiry 583, 588 (2005).
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ognizes this source of its authority: "We the People of the United States . . .
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America."' h9 The American people-not God-are the higher authority and
the limit on the authority of the federal government. Thus, this rationale
cannot support the inclusion of religious doctrine in the Pledge of
Allegiance.

IV.

CONCLUSION

As originally understood, the establishment clause removes the federal
government from the religious sphere-it prohibits federal government actions that prefer any religion in relation to any other religion, or in relation
to no religion at all, on the basis of the view that the favored religious belief
is better along one or another dimension of value (e.g. that the religious
belief is truer, more efficacious spiritually, or more authentically American). This interpretation is supported by the constitutional text and legislative history, the philosophical foundation of the Constitution, the federal
structure of the new government, and the historical practice of our early
leaders. Despite considering alternative proposals unambiguously adopting
other establishment clause int,erpretations, such as noncoercion and nonpreference, the first Congress adopted the relatively expansive text of the
First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion." In crafting the new Constitution, the founding generation was
greatly influenced by the philosophies of Roger Williams and John
Locke-civil government is created by men to govern man's earthly behavior, and must be separated from religious institutions so that each may effectively perform its unique function. By separating the federal government
from religion, the drafters also implemented an important structural safeguard of religious liberty-allowing more citizens to live according to their
personal convictions-and found a workable compromise for a highly-contentious issue. Finally, the actions of America's early leaders demonstrate
that, when the nation's attention was focused on the proper relationship
between government and religion, the nation repeatedly chose separation.
The continued vitality of the Constitution requires strict adherence to
its requirements, regardless of popular opinion and short-term political expedients. In 1954, Congress adopted legislation inserting the words "under
God" into the Pledge of Allegiance. In this context, the words are not
merely historical, ceremonial, or meaningless, and do not represent the constitutional limit on the authority of the federal government-they attempt to
link specific religious doctrine with America's core values. By adopting this
legislation, Congress thus broke America's long constitutional tradition of
secular government.
169. U.S. Const. preamble.

